Return of extremism: Shadow actors in Sudan’s war
Introduction
The outbreak of the Sudanese civil war in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) created a security vacuum that allowed latent Islamist networks — particularly those espousing violence — to resurface. While the international focus was largely on the conventional military confrontation between General Abdelfattah Al Burhan’s forces and those of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (commonly known as Hemeti), a parallel battlefield was unfolding: A battle for ideological influence, recruitment, and territorial control among Sudan’s dormant but reawakening extremist actors.
This report provides a comprehensive assessment of the extremist formations that have emerged or restructured in Sudan during and after the outbreak of the 2023 war. It identifies key armed battalions with radical orientations, their operational affiliations — whether aligned with the SAF or the RSF — and evaluates their tribal and ethnic compositions. It further examines any potential cross-border affiliations, particularly with transnational terrorist movements such as Boko Haram or Daesh in West Africa.
The report also documents prominent figures within these Islamist structures, highlighting their ideological positioning, battlefield roles, and recent public stances. The analysis is grounded in open-source intelligence (OSINT) and media verification. Where possible, it includes verified social media materials, leadership statements, and local tribal dynamics affecting recruitment and loyalty.
By situating these actors within the broader geopolitical and security landscape of the region — including the Sahel, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa — the report aims to clarify the risk of Sudan once again becoming a hub for African extremist movements.
I. Informational context: Understanding the historical roots
1. Sudanese Islamism traces its roots to genesis of modern Sudanese state
It began with the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood (الإخوان المسلمون) in the 1950s. The movement justified its political presence as an ideological opponent against the growing influence of leftist and Marxist-communist movements, while also aiming to undermine Sudan’s traditional religious fabric —particularly its Sufi-based spirituality. The movement established its political legitimacy by claiming credit for its role in the October 1964 Revolution, which overthrew President Ibrahim Abboud. Its pragmatic wing went on to form a new political front under the name Islamic Charter Front, which advocated for an Islamic constitution. The leader of this front secured a seat in parliament, using it as a platform to shift national political discourse toward philosophical and ideological debates.
2. First armed experience of Sudanese Islamist movement in 1976
This happened when it launched an insurgency against President Jaafar Nimeiri. The operation utilized a generation of military-aligned Islamists within the movement — such as Ahmed Abdelrahman and Ghazi Salahuddin Al Atabani — who coordinated with what was then known as the National Front, an alliance that included the Umma Party and Al Sharif Al Hindi, launching an invasion of Sudan from Libyan territory with the aim of toppling Nimeiri. After the operation failed, the Islamists came to understand the strategic necessity of infiltrating the Sudanese Armed Forces. However, their efforts largely failed — except through the indirect involvement of some Ba’athist officers and a few pragmatic actors within the military. Inspired by the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran in 1979, the Sudanese Islamists developed a renewed appetite for power and began articulating populist ideological frameworks and drafting preliminary economic blueprints for state governance.
3. Co-optation attempts during the Nimeiri era
During Nimeiri’s rule, the Sudanese Islamist movement sought to capitalize on the popularity of the broader opposition and enter government through a pragmatic reconciliation with the regime. It exploited Nimeiri’s growing religious sentiment and the emerging US policy of engaging Islamist movements as geopolitical assets during the Cold War. It was also during this period that Sudanese Islamism deepened its ties to the global Islamist network, linking domestic actors to transnational extremist circles — from mobilization for the war in Afghanistan to meetings with heads of state in the heart of the United States.
4. Entry into government and the road to military infiltration
The opportunity to participate in government following Nimeiri’s 1977 reconciliation with the Muslim Brotherhood played a pivotal role in enabling the Islamists to establish early links with the Sudanese Armed Forces. This included engagement with the then-Minister of Defense, Field Marshal Abdel Rahman Suwar Al Dahab , as well as a cadre of officers — most notably Colonel Omar Al Bashir, who would later successfully overthrow the democratically elected government of Ahmed Al Mirghani and Sadiq Al Mahdi. The National Islamic Front (NIF) , betrayed its coalition partners and orchestrated a full-scale military coup in 1989, coinciding with the emergence of a new global order shaped by the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan and the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Islamists seized power in Sudan believing they could play a functional role in this new international system.
5. Military resistance to Islamism prior to 1989
Until the 1989 coup, the Sudanese military had maintained a firm and institutional stance against Islamist infiltration. The officer corps repeatedly submitted formal memos opposing the appointment of NIF members to critical state positions and warning of the Islamists’ encroachment on military autonomy. In turn, the Islamists maintained a counter-narrative that the Sudanese Armed Forces rejected their presence because the military leadership was aligned with Egyptian and American strategic interests — portraying themselves as excluded patriots facing foreign-controlled institutions. The earlier declaration of Sharia law in 1983, which had partially normalized the idea of religious law within military discourse and provided justification for the emergence of a cohort of Islamist-leaning officers.
6. Consolidation of an Islamist wing within the army
Immediately after taking power in the 1989 coup, Omar Al Bashir moved to consolidate an Islamist wing within the SAF. He was also compelled to purge numerous officers with ideological or professional opposition to his rule — particularly Ba’athists, leftists, and technocratic officers. The situation escalated following the execution of the officers involved in the attempted ‘Ramadan 28 Coup’ in April 1990, a purge that deprived the military of a cadre of highly trained professionals from various units. Many others were forcibly retired under the so-called “public interest” policy (Al Salih Al Amm). Only Bashir’s allies, loyalists, defectors, seconded officers, or those who had joined opposition forces under General Khalil Ahmed Ali were spared.
7. Politicization of military recruitment and the erosion of professionalism
From 1991 onward, the professional integrity of the SAF came under deeper threat when the Islamist regime imposed ideological vetting procedures for entry into the Military Academy. Applicants were required to present endorsements from the ruling Islamist party or affiliated networks. This process enabled the Islamist movement to secure loyalty from a generation of junior and mid-ranking officers. Over time, this gave rise to a simmering sense of professional resentment among non-Islamist military personnel — though it did not immediately translate into organized resistance.
8. Parallel security institutions and doctrinal re-engineering
Despite its growing influence, the Islamist movement never fully trusted the military institution. As a result, it attempted to reshape the army’s doctrinal identity by injecting religious ideology into its operational principles — a project that met with only partial success. Failing to fully Islamize the SAF, the regime established parallel security institutions, auxiliary forces, and nationwide mobilization structures. Among these were the Popular Defense Forces, which served as a semi-official armed wing of the Islamist project. The PDF was built around militant volunteer formations collectively referred to as Al Mujahideen and Al Dabbabeen , both of which were infused with religious indoctrination and extremist training. Later, Bashir went a step further by creating the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as a paramilitary tool under presidential command, operating outside the traditional military hierarchy.
9. Transnational Islamism and regional subversion (1991)
The project of transnational Islamism in Sudan reached its apex in 1991, when Sudanese Islamists believed they had achieved maximum control over the internal state apparatus and could begin reshaping regional regimes. They perceived themselves as capable of influencing regime change in Ethiopia, where the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) — then dominant — was considered a close ally, and Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea was viewed as ideologically sympathetic.
As tensions began to rise between Sudan and neighboring countries, an extremist faction emerged within the regime’s foreign relations structure. This faction adopted a purely terrorist approach to regional engagement, leveraging Islamist networks in neighboring states to target their leaderships. This resulted in Sudan’s direct support for extremist actors in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (then known as Zaire), and Egypt. Sudanese Islamist operatives worked closely with counterparts in these countries, especially in Uganda, where two domestic radical groups emerged: (i) The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), led by Jamil Mukulu, with the stated goal of transforming Uganda into an Islamic state. (ii) The Uganda National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (UNLF/A) a smaller, fragmented formation.
While these groups began as political opposition movements fueled by grievances against President Yoweri Museveni, they were later hijacked by extremist ideologies, aided by financial and logistical support from both Sudan and the DRC. The collapse of the democratic vision left only their names behind, as extremist doctrine filled the ideological vacuum.
10. Sudan as a safe haven for global extremist leaders
During this same period, Sudan’s Islamist regime hosted a range of global extremist leaders and figures convicted in terrorism cases, including Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al Zawahiri, and Omar Abdel-Rahman. Khartoum served as a safe haven and logistical base for operational planning and international coordination. Sudanese territory was used as a launchpad for various terrorist plots during this period, placing a growing burden on Omar Al Bashir’s regime — a burden that did not go unnoticed or unopposed within parts of the military establishment.
11. Military resentment and the marginalization of the Armed Forces
Although the army was able to secure partial victories in southern Sudan during the civil war, those gains were achieved only through the joint efforts of Popular Defense Forces (PDF) fighters and conscripts mobilized through the National Service program. However, the Islamist regime credited these victories exclusively to its loyalist militias.
Government media campaigns — especially the televised program “Sahat Al Fida’” (The Fields of Redemption”) — glorified the Islamist fighters who were killed in action, while largely ignoring the sacrifices of regular SAF soldiers. This created a growing sense of frustration, marginalization, and resentment within the professional military ranks, resulting in quiet but mounting pressure on Bashir from within the officer corps.
12. Rift Between Al Bashir and Al Turabi: Strategic security consequences
The internal schism between the military component led by Omar Al Bashir and the Islamist component led by Hassan Al Turabi in 1998 resulted in the fragmentation of the Sudanese Islamist movement into two main factions: the National Congress Party and the Popular Congress Party. However, beyond political divergence, the split triggered a series of profound security and structural realignments, including the following:
a) Internal purge and creation of a loyal military-political class
Al Bashir became increasingly wary of Islamists loyal to Al Turabi within the regular armed forces and sought to neutralize or expel them to prevent the risk of a coup. He systematically dismissed, sidelined, or retired pro-Turabi officers and intelligence operatives. In their place, he cultivated a new layer of loyalists within the security sector, informally referred to as the ‘Party of the Army’ — even if some of its members had Islamist backgrounds, their primary allegiance was to Bashir personally.Furthermore, Bashir sought to professionalize and strengthen the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) to the point of pursuing and eliminating Turabi-aligned Islamists, including the arrest of Hassan Al Turabi himself.
b) The strategic deactivation of the Southern Front
As part of his strategy to diminish the influence of the Popular Defense Forces and their recruitment machinery, Al Bashir pushed for the cessation of hostilities in southern Sudan. This culminated in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with John Garang, which aimed not only to end the war but also to dry up the ideological and mobilizational base that the Islamists had long relied on in the south.
c) Turabi’s counter-mobilization in Darfur
In contrast, Hassan Al Turabi worked to redirect the flow of arms and violent energies toward a new front: Darfur. Exploiting themes of marginalization and center-periphery injustice, he helped popularize a discourse among his followers in Darfur that framed Khartoum’s political center as systematically oppressing Darfurians.
This narrative produced ideological outputs such as “The Black Book” and slogans like “Hamdi’s Triangle” — both of which originated in Islamist Darfurian circles before being adopted more broadly by leftist activists. The result was an unusual left–right alliance within Darfur’s anti-center mobilization.
Turabi also employed racially charged rhetoric, suggesting that Nile Valley Arab tribes practiced political supremacy over Black African tribes of Darfur. In this context, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was widely perceived as the armed wing of the Popular Congress Party.
d) RSF as a counterweight to Darfurian Islamist rebels
In response, Omar Al Bashir turned to the tribal components that would later constitute the Rapid Support Forces . He deployed them strategically against the rebel tribes in Darfur aligned with Turabi’s discourse, which by then had gained legitimacy among a broader spectrum of Darfurians.
Militarily, Turabi was defeated. However, he succeeded in politically implicating Bashir on the international stage by contributing to the International Criminal Court (ICC) charges. This effectively nullified the political capital Bashir had gained from signing the peace agreement with John Garang.
e) Regional reintegration and the counterterrorism bargain
Following this internal Islamist confrontation, Al Bashir worked to restore diplomatic relations with neighboring countries. In return for normalized ties, he offered packages of wanted terrorists, some of whom had previously received state protection.
This shift can be understood as part of a broader geopolitical realignment: the international environment that once supported Islamist armed movements had begun to collapse. Bashir’s reorientation coincided with the peace period between Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) led by John Garang, as well as the intensification of the global War on Terror. In this new context, states seen as competent counterterrorism partners were rewarded with enhanced legitimacy and diplomatic leverage.
13. Post-secession pressures and Bashir’s last security gamble
The secession of South Sudan in 2011 and the renewal of conflict in the border regions created a suffocating political and economic crisis for Sudan. After nearly two decades of allegiance to Bashir, a growing segment of the Islamist movement began to explore options for his replacement, offering a civilian alternative to authoritarian military-Islamist rule. However, Bashir quickly exploited existing divisions within the movement, fueling internal dissent and neutralizing any consolidated attempt to remove him.
In response to the escalating instability, Bashir shifted his focus toward strengthening the Sudanese Armed Forces and restructuring the national security apparatus in a way that would prevent any single agency from taking independent action without consulting him directly. Within the SAF, he reinforced the Air Force and Military Intelligence wings while reducing the size and influence of the Popular Defense Forces — transforming them into a reserve force tainted by corruption, thereby stripping them of their former spiritual and ideological credibility.
At the same time, Bashir sought to institutionalize the RSF as a hybrid National Guard unit designed to suppress internal rebellion and secure the borders. He tied the RSF into agreements with European actors (as part of the EU-backed Khartoum Process on migration control), aimed at transforming it into a quasi-private security firm capable of managing migration flows and border surveillance. Additionally, he allowed the Operations Authority of the NISS to receive specialized training and develop elite units.
Bashir implemented a framework in which all military and security bodies reported directly to him, seeking to position himself as the sole arbiter of deterrence and the guarantor of strategic balance among rival factions. However, he ultimately failed to depoliticize these forces. In the end, it was their joint consensus — across institutional and ideological lines — that brought about his downfall in April 2019.
14. Final moves before the fall: February 2019
Two months before he was removed from power — in February 2019 — Omar Al Bashir made a public declaration outlining the future role of the Sudanese Armed Forces, the NISS, and the RSF in safeguarding Sudan’s sovereignty. He proceeded to appoint all state governors exclusively from within these security institutions, signaling an intent to militarize provincial governance in the face of growing dissent.
15. Post-coup polarization: Civilian-military duality
Bashir’s ouster in April 2019 ushered in a new political reality defined by a deep bifurcation of power between two blocs: (i) A military bloc comprising the SAF and RSF.
(ii) A civilian bloc led by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), which quickly moved to monopolize the definition of “civility” and frame itself as the sole legitimate representative of civilian aspirations.
16. Islamist bureaucratic continuity under the Transitional Military Council
Due to the absence of a strong popular base, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) resorted to appointing state functionaries with known affiliations to the Islamist movement, either unintentionally or as part of a calculated decision. Some within the TMC reportedly believed that Bashir’s ouster was orchestrated by Islamists themselves as retribution for his betrayal of the movement.
This occurred at a time when the TMC had lost control of NISS, which had long served as the political brain of the regime. Lacking a viable technocratic alternative, the Council turned to two familiar political ecosystems: (i) Newly emerging civilian actors, and (ii) Islamists, who now found themselves recast as “old rivals” with new opportunities.
17. Tactical co-optation of Islamists by the military
Even after signing the power-sharing agreement with the Forces of Freedom and Change in 2019, the military component of the transitional government continued to seek a civilian political base with street influence.
To this end, it adopted a strategy of manipulating and co-opting Islamist actors, drawing on the fractured factions of the Muslim Brotherhood. The military’s efforts were bolstered by the presence of prominent Islamists such as: (i)Ghazi Salah Al Din Al Atabani and (ii) Mohamed Ali Al Jazouli. Both of whom had participated early in Bashir’s ouster and believed they could help construct a new political order by cooperating with the very movements that led the regime change — arguing that they possessed the ideological depth and rhetorical skill to craft an effective political narrative.
It must also be noted that the power-sharing agreement left many critical issues unresolved and subject to further negotiation—such as the chairmanship of the Sovereignty Council, the scheduling of national elections, and the future role of the army and the RSF.
This ambiguity created space for further political maneuvering, and the civilian bloc itself became fragmented, with some actors aligning — directly or indirectly — with the very military institutions they had once opposed.
18. Split within the Sovereignty Council and ethnic re-polarization
As tensions escalated between the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and his Deputy, the Islamist movement repositioned itself as a political broker, offering services and alignment to both sides. The competition took on ethnic and geographic dimensions, with northern factions gravitating toward SAF and western (Darfurian) groups leaning toward RSF, thereby triggering new lines of fragmentation along regional and tribal identities.
19. Return of Ali Karti and the re-emergence of public Islamist messaging
Under the pretext of “broadening the base of political participation”, former Foreign Minister Ali Karti — the acting Secretary-General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement — reappeared publicly for the first time since going into hiding after Bashir’s fall.
He appeared on Tayba TV, a satellite channel owned by prominent Islamist cleric Abdel-Hay Youssef, who himself had fled to Turkey. The interview was conducted openly in Khartoum, under the observant but permissive eye of Sudanese security agencies, indicating a shift in the state’s posture toward public Islamist rhetoric.
20. Public endorsement for the return of Islamists by “Palace Faction” leaders
A wave of public statements followed the collapse of the transitional arrangement, most notably by:Jibril Ibrahim, current Minister of Finance, and Minni Arko Minnawi, Governor of the Darfur Region. Both leaders, associated with the so-called “Palace Faction”, publicly supported the reintegration of Islamist actors into Sudan’s political landscape — on the condition that their own positions within the ruling structure would be preserved.
21. Fragmentation within Islamist movements
This phase was also shaped by deep fragmentation within the Islamist ecosystem itself, including: (i) the Islamic Movement; (ii) the National Congress Party (NCP); and (iii) the Popular Congress Party (PCP). Each of these organizations fractured into multiple sub-blocs based on shifting variables such as: Ethnic alignments; positions on political reform; generational divides; and loyalty rivalries involving key historical figures such as Al Turabi Nafi Ali Nafi and Ali Osman Taha.
These internal dynamics weakened the ability of Islamists to present a unified front, while simultaneously creating space for factional maneuvering and realignment.
22. Populist religious reframing and the rise of the broad Islamist current
The reorganization of Islamist forces began to draw strength from deflection issues in the public discourse, such as: The controversy over curriculum reform; debates surrounding international agreements; and the accumulation of policy failures by the transitional government.
These themes were instrumentalized to reintroduce religious identity into political discourse in a populist tone, allowing Islamist actors to claim that they alone could defend Sudanese values, morality, and Islamic identity. This rhetoric found tacit approval from both the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Sovereignty Council at the time.
Out of this momentum emerged the so-called Broad Islamist Current — a coalition of 10 Islamist organizations and platforms, including: the Sudanese Islamic Movement; the Reform Now Movement; the Muslim Brotherhood – Awadallah Hussein Faction; Just Peace Forum; State of Law and Development Party; and the Future Movement for Reform and Development
Notably, the Popular Congress Party did not sign onto the alliance, as it pursued a separate alignment with the military establishment, distancing itself from the broader Islamist coalition for two key reasons: The PCP regarded itself as the legitimate heir to Al urabi’s legacy, and the party was internally divided, with Secretary-General Ali Al Haj opposing the position of other factions within the organization.
| Party/Movement | Key Leadership |
| National Congress Party (former ruling party, absent from the Broad Current Conference) | Ibrahim Ghandour (President), Amin Hassan Ogha (Secretary-General), Ali Karti (Leader of the Brotherhood’s Special Operations in Sudan), Amin Hassan Omar, Awad Ibn Auf, Mohamed Al Taher, Abdel-Hay Youssef (Ministerial nominee), Ahmed Al Mufaddal, Adel Mahjoub |
| Reform Now Movement (formerly part of the NCP) | Ghazi Salah Al Din (President), Jaafar Al Sadiq (Deputy), Othman Rizq, Dr. Mohamed Abdel-Karim, Hassan Rizq, Khalid Nouri (defected), Sami Abdel-Wahhab, Naji Imam (Student Affairs Coordinator) |
| Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) | Jibril Ibrahim (Finance Minister), from the Zaghawa tribe in Darfur; Hamid Yahya (recent defector); Abdel-Rahman Salim Fadl |
| State of Law and Development Party (formerly part of the NCP) | Mohamed Ali al-Jazouli (President), Aqil Naeem Al Fadni (Secretary-General), Al Bushra Mohamed Othman, Dr. Iqbal Ahmed Abu-Doum, Habib Hatim Hamid Badawi |
| Future Movement for Reform (formerly part of the NCP) | Dr. Naji Mustafa (President), Howaida Babiker (Deputy), Abdel-Wahid Youssef, Hani Ahmed Taj Al Sir, Qusay Mahjoub, Safiya Yahya |
| Just Peace Forum (formerly part of the NCP) | Mohamed Abu Zaid Karoum (Secretary-General) |
| National Justice Alliance (formerly part of the NCP) | Tijani Al Sisi (President), Ahmed Fadl, Bahr Idris |
| Renaissance Current (alternative Islamist current replacing the NCP) | Mohamed Majzoub (President), Hisham Babiker (Deputy), Fath Al Aleem Abdel-Hay |
| Unity of the Ranks Initiative (a current of Islamists who chose neutrality) | Hashem Mohamed Al Sheikh, Dr. Ibrahim Al Buhari |
| Popular Congress Party (Ali al-Haj’s faction did not join the Broad Current) | Ali Al Haj Adam (Political Secretary), Kamal Omar |
| Muslim Brotherhood | Awadallah Hassan Sayyed Ahmed (Leader), Hassan Abdel-Hamid (Deputy), Al Habr Youssef Nour Al Daem |
The RSF commander surrounded himself with advisors who had prior affiliations with the Islamic Front government. Many of them had political backgrounds rooted in the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood — including both hardline Islamists such as former Vice President Hasbu Abdelrahman and influential tribal elites.
However, the RSF also appointed the enigmatic advisor Youssef Izzat, who attempted to introduce a new civilian-oriented discourse, centered on addressing marginalization and constructing a “New Sudan” framework.
Notably, in April 2025, Youssef Izzat publicly reaffirmed the RSF’s links to the Islamist movement, attributing this connection to a lack of political awareness among the RSF’s leadership.
23. Local extremism reignited by the war
The war served as a lifeline for the Islamist movement, allowing it to reclaim mobilization energy and channel the narrative of “defense” into a strategic bid to influence Sudan’s future. Following the outbreak of the conflict, several factions emerged and began fighting in an organized manner. Many of these formations were revivals of legacy militias from the previous regime, or were reactivated through dormant Islamist military networks.The following are the most notable of these entities:
a) Al Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade
Originally known as the Baraa ibn Malik Battalion, this force was upgraded to a brigade several weeks after the war began, following an influx of volunteer Islamist fighters who joined the SAF.
The brigade consists of hundreds of former Popular Defense Forces fighters, many of whom were re-assigned to the Armored Corps in southern Khartoum. It is led by Al Musbah Abu Zaid and adopts a clearly extremist discourse, producing battlefield propaganda infused with Islamist anthems, often quoting Sayyid Qutb.
Its messaging transcends national defense, invoking transnational Islamist symbolism tied to movements, as seen in the uniforms, slogans, and insignia displayed by the brigade’s commander.
The SAF appears to tolerate accusations of war crimes and abuses committed by this unit, possibly as a cost-offsetting tactic to shield the regular army. Al-Musbah Abu Zaid has appeared in photographs with prominent extremists such as Mukhtar Badri and Al Naji Abdullah.
b) Al Bunyan Al Marsous Battalion
This is one of the largest Islamist battalions active in the current conflict. It was formerly part of the Popular Defense Forces before their official dissolution in 2020. The battalion was reconstituted after the outbreak of war and includes elements from the former NISS, particularly those who lost their positions after the fall of Al Bashir.
Al Bunyan Al Marsous has received advanced weapons training and is now deployed alongside the army in various sectors across the tri-city Khartoum area. Intelligence reports indicate that its ranks also include operatives from the Islamist-linked “Popular Security” unit, a clandestine apparatus previously tied to the Sudanese Islamic Movement.
c) Darfur-based armed movements
It is worth noting that the Justice and Equality Movement, a Darfur-based armed group with a historically Islamist-oriented leadership, is not classified as a global terrorist entity. Rather, it is a local radical movement guided by an extremist vision, not a transnational terrorist ideology.
Nonetheless, its leadership — including Dr. Jibril Ibrahim — has politically aligned itself with the SAF after the war or attempted to mediate rather than escalate the conflict through global extremist rhetoric. That said, speculation about JEM’s ties to Boko Haram resurfaced after the targeted attack on the Chadian presidential palace of Mahamat Déby , raising concerns about overlapping networks in the Sahel region.
24. Popular Resistance Movements: Local mobilization beyond ideology
Following the escalation of atrocities in central Sudan, particularly after the RSF entered Gezira State in December 2023, a growing segment of the population became convinced of the necessity to resist the RSF’s expansion, primarily for personal and familial safety rather than ideological reasons.
Extremist actors initially refused to fight under the formal command of the SAF, rejecting conscription into the regular military. In response, General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan attempted a workaround by offering only recruitment and training, while calling for mass participation in armed resistance supervised by the SAF through its formal units — claiming insufficient funds to arm them.
In practice, Islamists and sympathetic business figures stepped in to provide resources, using populist religious rhetoric to rally volunteers. This allowed them to take over much of the leadership of the “Popular Resistance”, while many ordinary citizens joined the movement for ethnic or revenge-driven motives, rather than ideological or religious commitment.
The Popular Resistance Committees emerged most visibly in states such as the Northern State, River Nile, Kordofan, and Sennar. These groups underwent military training under SAF supervision, and included among their ranks members of “Ghadiboon Bila Hodood” — a previously loosely organized youth protest movement (ages 17–24) that had been active during the revolution. Many of its cadres later joined military engineering or armored units.
This popular resistance possesses a highly localized mobilization profile, encompassing a fluid mix of Islamists, leftists, anarchists, disillusioned youth, and nationalists—making it one of the most ideologically diverse formations in the conflict.
25. Army’s ambiguity toward Islamist militias
The SAF command has consistently avoided formally acknowledging the presence of Islamist-aligned militias fighting alongside them, for two main reasons: (i) To maintain the professional image of the army in the public and international eye. (ii) To prevent external scrutiny or sanctions.
However, in practice, formations such as the Baraa ibn Malik Brigade, Al Bunyan Al Marsous Battalion, and others have been incorporated into SAF command structures. Other battalions — such as Sijjil, originally linked to the Special Operations Division of the intelligence service, and Al Furqan — have also been reactivated, reportedly under the guise of local civilian defense. SAF officers have stated publicly that the members of these formations are merely citizens defending their homeland under the army’s banner.
Despite this narrative, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the SAF has, on several occasions, warned about the growing influence of the Popular Resistance, criticizing its religious slogans and lack of discipline. He even suggested that these groups must be brought under tighter control — but later walked back on his statements following the collapse of the Manama Agreement.
There remain concerns among analysts that allowing these forces to grow unchecked could recreate a future dilemma akin to the RSF itself. The army command is acutely aware of the international implications, especially given the US -aligned ambitions of its senior leadership. Hence, it continues to frame RSF attacks on airports, hospitals, and infrastructure as acts of terrorism under international law, attempting to distinguish its own actions from those of its irregular auxiliaries.
26. Islamists assert control over the army’s decision-making
Islamist figures have consistently sought to portray themselves as influential power brokers within the SAF. Notably, Ali Karti declared in a widely circulated statement that “Al Burhan will not be allowed to sign any agreement over the corpses of our sons” — a comment published in Asharq Al Awsat newspaper (March 12, 2024).
Although the statement was later retracted in an official clarification, its intended political impact had already been achieved, signaling the Islamists’ leverage over military decisions and their readiness to use inflammatory rhetoric to obstruct political settlements.
27. Sloganeering and the emergence of ideologically ambiguous groups
Other groups have surfaced primarily through popular slogans and social media branding — such as “Al Mughayyirat” and “Al Matamir” . While these entities remain loosely structured and not formally documented, they are worth monitoring as potential mobilization fronts or digital echo chambers.
Observers suggest that many of these names are exploited simultaneously by multiple actors, each for distinct political or propaganda objectives, making attribution and intent difficult to verify.
28. Rise of regionally-based, unstructured militias
The war also enabled the emergence of regionally-based armed groups that are not clearly aligned with existing political or ideological movements. These include formations such as: (i) Eastern Battalion and (ii) Butana Shield.
Such groups represent inter-tribal military mobilizations and remain largely unstudied, lacking public political programs or overt affiliations. Their emergence underscores the fragmentation of the war landscape and the weaponization of regional and tribal identity.
29. Logistical and intelligence support from former Islamist security networks
Given the operational experience of former Popular Security and NISS personnel who joined the conflict, Islamists have provided crucial tactical support to the SAF, particularly in field intelligence and reconnaissance.
Former intelligence officers are actively engaged in intelligence-gathering operations and combat coordination. According to Western sources, approximately 6,000 former NISS operatives have joined the military effort. These individuals possess deep knowledge of asymmetric warfare tactics, making them strategic assets in urban and guerrilla-style engagements.
30. Al Qaeda, Daesh, and transnational terrorist networks in Sudan
Although Omar Al Bashir expelled Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan and confiscated some of his assets for the state, Sudan’s links to Al Qaeda and its logistical facilitation remained under scrutiny for years. Sudanese nationals within Al Qaeda and Daesh were often denied promotion due to suspicions of collaboration with Sudanese authorities, who managed the file through security apparatuses.
The outbreak of the current war created unprecedented opportunities for extremist organizations to regroup and expand within Sudan. Although foreign Islamist movements did not participate in Sudan’s civil war in the 1990s, Sudan remained a strategic waypoint for groups like Al Qaeda, and the Houthis. It was a logistical base for travel, recruitment, and operations until bin Laden returned to Afghanistan.
In October 2022, al-Qaeda released a message by a commander named Abu Hudhayfah Al Sudani titled Now the Fight Begins: Messages to the Mujahideen in Sudan. The letter urged Sudanese youth to adopt strategic thinking, assess their military and political capacities, and use Sudan’s vast, diverse geography for guerrilla warfare. It outlined three phases: Hit-and-run, balance, and final empowerment.
Before Bashir’s fall in 2019, Sudanese intelligence reported that there were around 700 extremist operatives in the country, primarily in Khartoum. Some Sudanese rose to leadership roles within Daesh, particularly in Somalia, where figures like Bilal Al Sudani led logistics and the Al Karrar office until his death in a 2023 US raid.
Daesh recruitment in Sudan included students from Mamoun Hamida University (UMST), many of whom were medical students and children of former officials. Some were recruited by Mohamed Ali Al Jazouli, who was detained by the RSF in early 2023. Sudanese Daesh members were active in Libya and Idlib, and some are now re-emerging under Syria’s new government.
Daesh also used Sudan for logistics. In 2016, Moez Fezzani, a top Daesh-Tunisia operative, was arrested in Sudan. In 2019, Sudan arrested six Boko Haram members in Darfur. On December 6, 2019, Sudanese intelligence thwarted an infiltration from Chad by Boko Haram-linked terrorists and handed them over to Chadian authorities.
In 2021, Sudanese intelligence raided Daesh cells in Khartoum’s Jabra and Al Azhari neighborhoods, killing five officers and arresting 11 foreign nationals. Further operations led to the arrest of additional suspects, including a Somali citizen. A July 2023 UN report stated that Daesh operations and financing in Sudan are overseen by Abu Bakr Al Iraqi, who runs front companies in Sudan and Turkey. The UN estimates that 100–200 experienced Daesh fighters operate in Sudan, facilitating logistics and finances. Sudan also serves as a gateway to Libya, Mali, and West Africa. In January 2025, Daesh’s newspaper ‘An Naba’ published an article titled The Forgotten Sudan,calling on its members in neighboring countries to re-establish their presence inside Sudan.
Both Daesh and Al Qaeda are competing to gain control over mining routes and maritime access. Their strategy of ‘war through maritime chokepoints’ underscores Sudan’s importance near global shipping lines — especially oil tankers. This increases extremist interest in operations near the Red Sea.
Sudan’s current war has created a state of fluidity that provides cover for extremist groups to embed themselves in the country. More concerning, Sudan’s deteriorating relations with neighboring Chad, Central African Republic, and Niger may revive ties with Islamist opposition groups there — as occurred previously with Uganda.
31. Prison breaks by extremists amid April 2023 battles
As fighting intensified in Khartoum in April 2023, several Sudanese prisons witnessed mass jailbreaks, including the escape of high-risk extremist detainees. At Kober Prison — a maximum-security facility — foreign militants affiliated with Daesh and Al Qaeda, who had been detained between 2020 and 2021, were among the inmates. By April 22, many prisoners had reportedly escaped amidst the chaos. Intelligence assessments and open-source reports indicated that individuals linked to Daesh and Al Qaeda were likely among those who fled.
32. Release and online activities of Abu Hudhayfah Al Sudani
Abu Hudhayfah Al Sudani, a senior figure in Al Qaeda, reappeared online following his alleged release from prison in Sudan. He published an Eid greeting video on his newly launched platform, which had been created a few months prior.
While the SAF denied any role in releasing him, other sources suggested he had relocated to Syria. In the video, he called for terrorist violence in Sudan, urged unity among extremists, and described the current moment as a strategic opportunity for re-establishing militant presence inside the country. He also announced the publication of his new book titled: Leaning on the Edge of the Sword.
33. Re-emergence of Popular Defense commanders in propaganda
Former Islamist figures and Popular Defense Forces veterans have resurfaced via media channels, promoting slogans, nasheeds, and extremist-themed content under the banner of “morale boosting.”
These efforts include: (i) Publicized visits, such as Al Naji Abdullah’s meeting with Al Musbah Abu Zaid; (ii) the reappearance of individuals previously accused in high-profile terrorism cases, including the assassination attempt on then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
These visual campaigns aim to: (i) Resurrect the narrative of religious vengeance; (ii) reignite nostalgic sentiment among supporters; (iii) rebuild grassroots recruitment networks linked to foundational extremist ideologies.
II. Analytical Framework: Islamists and the endgame of war
34. Reproducing the logic of exclusion: Post-war political monopoly
Following the ouster of Omar Al Bashir in 2019, the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) imposed a blanket ban on political participation for any party that did not take part in the protest movement leading up to the January 6, 2019 Declaration of Freedom and Change. This exclusionary framework targeted not only Islamists but also non-Islamist figures such as Mubarak Al Fadil Al Mahdi and Mohamed al-Hassan al-Mirghani.
The FFC eventually converted Resistance Committees into de facto governance structures, with no electoral legitimacy, while denying other actors a role in shaping national politics. This drew significant criticism, even from within Islamist ranks.
Today, Islamists are replicating this same model, positioning themselves for exclusive post-war control in the event of a military victory. They now demand that: (i) Resistance Committees be transformed into electoral legitimacy-based governance bodies; (ii) only those who fought against the RSF were allowed to participate politically.
A notable pattern is that whenever the Sudanese army makes gains in the battlefield, the commander of the Baraa ibn Malik Brigade appears immediately for filmed statements and symbolic gestures, which resemble a quid pro quo — allowing Islamist units visibility at “victory moments” in order to rehabilitate their image among war-affected communities that suffered at the hands of the RSF.
35. Framing the army as the “Islamists’ Army” and sabotaging peace negotiations
The Islamist bloc is actively working to block any political or military initiative that may lead to a ceasefire, by escalating tensions on two fronts: (i) Undermining the SAF leadership — accusing it of betrayal whenever it shows openness to negotiations in Jeddah, Manama, or other forums; (ii) Spreading rumors within the SAF — suggesting that General Al Burhan is preparing to abandon the Islamists in a future political settlement.
Their goal is to frame the army as their own ideological vehicle, making any divergence from this path appear as treason.
36. Defining nationalism through exclusion: Granting or denying patriotic legitimacy
To prepare the ground for political exclusion, Islamists have begun monopolizing nationalist legitimacy, presenting themselves as the sole arbiters of who qualifies as patriotic.
For example, in Damazin, a Unionist Party leader was prevented from addressing a spontaneous public gathering on the grounds that his party had not fielded a battalion in the war, and therefore had no right to “ride the wave of victory.”
This narrative dominance is facilitated by their heavily funded media outlets, newspapers, and digital platforms — and is amplified by the weakness of opposing voices.
37. Transnational rhetoric and ethnic agitation
Islamists are increasingly analyzing the conflict using a transnational extremist framework, deliberately crafting post-state narratives that tie Sudan’s internal war to broader geopolitical struggles. They: (i) Demonize moderate Arab states to justify future hostilities; (ii) fuel ethnic discourse, especially Arab-versus-African tensions; and (iii) attempt to internationalize the conflict as part of a broader ideological and religious war.
This framing aims to justify future measures, delegitimize international actors, and exploit regional fears to their advantage.
III. Conclusion
The Sudanese civil war has enabled the reactivation of extremist networks that had been dormant or politically sidelined since the fall of the Al Bashir regime. These groups have resurfaced not only as auxiliary forces on the battlefield but as political actors seeking to shape the post-war order. The war blurred distinctions between formal military units and ideologically driven militias, with formations like the Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade and Al Bunyan Al Marsous operating under SAF command while maintaining independent Islamist agendas.
Islamist actors have leveraged battlefield alliances, media influence, and historical networks to position themselves as indispensable to the army’s war effort. In doing so, they have reclaimed a degree of legitimacy and visibility lost after 2019. The SAF’s ambiguous stance — neither fully embracing nor disavowing these forces — has allowed Islamist elements to expand their footprint without formal accountability.
At the same time, transnational extremist groups such as Daesh and Al Qaeda have found renewed opportunity in the security vacuum, using Sudan as a logistical corridor and recruitment ground. Local Islamist figures have framed the war in transnational and sectarian terms, reinforcing narratives of ideological struggle and national identity exclusion.
The trajectory of Sudan’s conflict suggests a growing risk that extremist formations will transition from temporary battlefield partners to entrenched power brokers in any future political settlement. Their integration into military and civilian structures may not only shape the endgame of the war but redefine the parameters of Sudanese statehood in its aftermath.
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